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PREFACE 
Research work on  "Problems of  S c a l e "  was s t a r t e d  a t  IIASA 
i n  Janua ry  1978, i n  t h e  Management and Technology A r e a .  A s  
w a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  i n  a n  IIASA Research Memorandum i n  September 
(Cant ley  and Glagolev ,  1978) ,  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  s c a l e  can  b e ,  and 
has  been,  d i s c u s s e d  a t  many l e v e l s  and i n  t h e  language of  many 
d i s c i p l i n e s .  T h i s  pape r  r e p r e s e n t s  one o f  t h e  s e v e r a l  d i r e c t i o n s  
of  development of  t h i s  work. O the r s  w i l l  be  d i s c u s s e d  a t  t h e  
June  1979 IIASA workshop, " S c a l e  and  P r o d u c t i v e  Ef f i c i ency- -  
The Wider I m p l i c a t i o n s " .  
I n  d i s c i p l i n a r y  t e r m s ,  t h e  pape r  i s  concerned w i t h  long-  
term s t r a t e g i c  p l ann ing .  I t  was p r e p a r e d  f o r  an O p e r a t i o n s  
Research Congress ,  b u t  t a k e s  a broad i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of t h e  
scope  o f  "O.R.", and  i n c l u d e s  r e f e r e n c e  n o t  o n l y  t o  s t r a t e g i c  
p l ann ing  b u t  n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y ,  t h e  economics o f  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  and t h e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  a s p e c t s  of 
s u p r a - n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  groups  such  a s  t h e  European Communities. 
Although s e t  i n  terms of  t h e  s p e c i f i c  contemporary problems 
o f  economic growth ,  unemployment and r e g i o n a l  imbalance i n  
Western Europe,  t h e r e  a r e  c l e a r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  management 
and c o n t r o l  of  o t h e r  l a r g e - s c a l e  connec ted  sys tems.  

ABSTRACT 
The first half of the paper introduces concepts useful in 
the application of O.R. to strategic problems. "Structural dy- 
namics" concerns the lead times for strategic adaptation, the 
planning horizons implied and the "instrumental" approach to 
maintaining adaptive capability. "Strategic monitoring" is re- 
quired for long cycle societal learning and control. Models of 
the causal texture of the environment have been developed by 
Emery and Trist, including particularly, the "turbulent field1'. 
These concepts are applied in the second half of the paper 
to the resolution of two contemporary issues in European integra- 
tion: economic expansion to maintain employment, and problems 
of polarization and regional imbalance. The deficiencies of the 
liberal free trade model are discussed, particularly its neglect 
of the effect of cumulative dynamic economies of scale. The 
re-adoption is advocated of national control over aggregate in- 
ward trade flow, as a means of resolving the "convicts' dilemma" 
situation of tightly inter-connected and interdependent national 
economies. The recommendations are related to neo-functionalist 
theories of political structure, the intention being not to criti- 
cize the concept of the European Communities, but to suggest that 
more analytic and strategic consideration be given to the location 
of functional responsibilities--including those for economic man- 
agement--at appropriate level within the system. 

TABLE O F  CONTENTS 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
1 . 1  C a n  O.R .  E m b r a c e  S t r a t e g y ?  
1 . 2  S t r u c t u r e  of P a p e r  
2 .  STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS, S T R A T E G I C  'CONTROL AND 
TURBULENT F I E L D S  
P a g e  
1  
2 . 1  S t r u c t u r a l  D y n a m i c s :  T i m e  H o r i z o n s  and 
T i m e l i n e s s  4  
2 . 2  A s s u m p t i o n s ,  St ra teg ic  M o d e l s ,  and t h e  
N e e d  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  C o n t r o l  and Societal  
L e a r n i n g  8 
2 . 3  T h e  C a u s a l  T e x t u r e  of E n v i r o n m e n t s  1 1  
3. THE CASE STUDY: AN OLD SOLUTION,  TWO EUROPEAN 
PROBLEMS AND A  NEW SOLUTION 
3 . 1  T h e  L i b e r a l ,  I n t e g r a t e d ,  F r e e  T r a d e  Model-- 1 4  
3 . 2  - -And I t s  S h o r t c o m i n g s  1 5  
3 . 3  A  C l u s t e r  of C o n t e m p o r a r y  S t r a t e g i c  P r o b l e m s  2 4  
3 . 4  T h e  E m p l o y m e n t  P r o b l e m  2 6  
3.5 B a l a n c e d  Development/Polarization 30 
3 . 6  A d a p t a t i o n  t o  T u r b u l e n t  F i e l d  C o n d i t i o n s ,  
V a l u e s ,  and C o r r e s p o n d i n g  P o l i t i c a l  St ruc tu r e s  3 2  
3.7 T h e  Inadequacy of t h e  Free T r a d e  M o d e l ;  
R e g u l a t e d  T r a d e  3 6  
4 .  CONCLUSION 4 0  
REFERENCES 

SCALE, PROTECTIONISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: 
THE STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS OF STRATEGIC CONTROL 
I N  A TURBULENT FIELD 
Mark F. Can t l ey  
1. . INTRODUCTION 
1 . 1  Can O.R.  Embrace S t r a t e g y ?  
The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  O p e r a t i o n a l  Research a s  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n s  h a s  t h e  merits of b r e v i t y  and h i s t o r i c a l  v a l i d i t y .  
Within t h e  m i l i t a r y  c o n t e x t  of O . R . ' s  o r i g i n s ,  however, 
"Opera t ions"  a r e  a  c l a s s  of  a c t i v i t y  d i s t i n c t  from " S t r a t e g y " ,  
and g e n e r a l l y  more l i m i t e d  i n  t e r m s  of  t h e  t i m e ,  space  and 
scope of r e s o u r c e s  and a c t i v i t i e s  encompassed. "Research i n t o  
o p e r a t i o n s "  h a s  a  good down-to-earth r i n g  of p r a c t i c a l i t y  and 
d i r ty -handed  involvement .  I n  t h e  words of an e a r l y  and success -  
f u l  p r a c t i t i o n e r  (of  bo th  t a c t i c a l  o p e r a t i o n s  and grand  s t r a t e g y )  
" I f  you want t o  a c q u i r e  knowledge you must t a k e  p a r t  
i n  t h e  p r a c t i c e  of changing r e a l i t y .  
I f  w e  have a  c o r r e c t  t h e o r y ,  b u t  merely t a l k  a b o u t  it, 
l a y  it a s i d e ,  and f a i l  t o  p u t  it i n t o  p r a c t i c e ,  t h e n  
t h a t  t h e o r y ,  however good, h a s  no importance.  
Knowledge b e g i n s  w i t h  p r a c t i c e ,  r e a c h e s  t h e  t h e o r e t -  
i c a l  l e v e l  th rough p r a c t i c e ,  and t h e n  r e t u r n s  t o  
p r a c t i c e . "  (Mao Tse Tung, 1937) 
However, t h e  development ,  e x e c u t i o n  and c o n t r o l  o f  s t r a t e g y  
a r e  m a t t e r s  no less p r a c t i c a l  t h a n  t h o s e  o f  o p e r a t i o n s ,  though 
t h e r e  b e  less d i r t  under  o n e ' s  f i n g e r - n a i l s  t o  prove  it. 
Gadsby (1965) h a s  d e s c r i b e d  how w i t h i n  t h e  post-war m i l i t a r y  
c o n t e x t  of t h e  U . K .  Army O p e r a t i o n a l  Research E s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  was p r o g r e s s i v e l y  
accep ted  a t  t h e  v a r i o u s  l e v e l s  of a c t i v i t y  from t a c t i c a l  t o  
s t r a t e g i c .  Although t h e  v a l i d a t i o n  of  o n e ' s  hypo theses ,  t h e  
practical tcsting of one's model, may take longer, the same 
quantitative and analytical habits of mind should in principle 
be of value in the strategic context of corporate and national 
planning, and are indeed increasingly being so accepted in 
companies and in government departments. 
Lest it be thought that we seek to be non-controversial, 
let us remind ourselves of the modest way in which a former 
president of the O.R. Society of America, Charles Hitch (1957), 
denied the relevance of his discipline to broader issues: 
"I would make the empirical generalization from my 
experien.ce at Rand and elsewhere that operations 
research is the art of sub-optimizing, that is, of 
solving some lower-level problems, and that difficul- 
ties increase and our special competence diminishes 
by an order of magnitude with every level of decision- 
making we attempt to ascend. The sort of simple 
explicit model which operations researchers are so 
proficient in using can certainly reflect most of the 
significant factors influencing traffic control on the 
George Washington Bridge, but the proportion of the 
relevant reality which we can represent by any such 
model or models in studying, say, a major foreign- 
policy decision, appears to be almost trivial." 
This quotation was used by Lindblom (1969) in his classic 
defence of what Simon and Ackoff would term satisficing: the 
practice of muddling through, of making successive incremental 
decisions in the light of current pressures, and of forswearing 
anything so academic, impractical and inapplicable as a theory 
or a model. One might answer Hitch by enquiring whether the 
track record of U.S. foreign policy evidenced a greater mind, 
a grander grasp, or the application of a more effective disci- 
pline, than might have been achievable by a scientific approach 
based on research into operations. By which I do not mean 
Pentagon acronyms, but the formulation of attainable policy 
objectives based on empirical observations and deduction; the 
sort of approach whose successful application in Malaya was 
described by Sir Robert Thompson (1966). The sort of approach 
which, had the U.S. foreign policy makers paid attention to 
the local observations of their own South-East Asian staff in 
1945, could have avoided the subsequent vast and ineffective 
squandering of resources, and suffering; the Flay 1972 hearings 
of the Fulbright Committee contain illuminating details 
(Committee on Foreign Relations, 1972). 
This argument is an old one, but worth reiterating. The 
quotation from Hitch was in fact his dissent from the earlier 
advocacy by Ackoff of O.R. Is potential contribution to national 
planning, particularly in underdeveloped countries such as 
India (Ackoff, 1957). In his subsequent rejoinder, Ackoff 
(1958) pointed out that Hitch's approach was intrinsically 
conservative, and argued that 
"if operations researchers were restricted to problems 
on which current operations-research techniques, 
narrowly defined, were applicable, at least half the 
problems that have been attacked by OR would not have 
been looked at, and at least some of the more important 
of these techniques would never have been developed. 
It has always seemed to me that part of the special 
competence of OR practitioners is the ability to 
develop suitable techniques for at least some problems 
for which existing techniques are inadequate." 
The need Ackoff refers to for the development of techniques 
certainly exists in many contemporary strategic problems, and 
it is that challenge which we seek to take up. Against Lindblom's 
dismissal of theory, one must surely set Keynes's observation 
that when business leaders congratulate themselves on being 
down-to-earth practical men, they are usually acting under the 
dead hand of some long-deceased theoretical economist. 
Tocher sums it up admirably in pointing out ( 1 9 7 0 )  that 
"at the heart of every decision there lies a model. This may 
be very rudimentary; its existence may not impinge upon the 
consciousness, but without it control is impossible." And the 
strategic decisions have to be made, are made, by default if 
not by deliberation. On whose models are the strategic decisions 
to be based? Economists,.political scientists, military 
strategists, newspaper editors or artists? It is the long-term 
more than the short which most requires the inter-disciplinary 
approach, because of the former's greater scope for imbrication 
of the paths of compartmentalized activity. 
It is appropriate therefore in this conference, and in 
this interdisciplinary assembly, to consider some of the 
strategic aspects of European integration, the policy models 
which underly them, and the mechanisms of strategic control. 
1 . 2  Structure of Paper 
In the spirit of Mao Tse Tung's words about theory and 
practice, we shall mix both in what follows. Strategy concerns 
the relationship of a purposeful system with its environment, 
and we start by considering the structural dynamics of this 
relationship. Big ships turn slowly, and must therefore look 
further ahead; "structural dynamics" could be-described as a 
concern with turning circles, rocks, and collision avoidance 
procedures. This theoretical treatment is then linked to 
"strategic control", a pair of words too rarely connected. 
Modelling the environment in which these activities are practised, 
we complete our conceptual tool-kit by borrowing from Emery and 
Trist ( 1 9 6 5 )  their ideal types of "organizational environment", 
particularly the "disturbed reactive" and the "turbulent field". 
Thus equipped, we try the tools on one of the central 
conceptual strategic models of the current drive for European 
integration, and suggest its revision. The whole tale being 
not so much a paradigm as a parable, which the reader/listener 
may view as David and Goliath, or Don Quixote and the windmills, 
according as his taste and fancy dictate. 
2. STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS, STRATEGIC CONTROL AND TURBULENT FIELDS 
2.1 Structural Dynamics: Time Horizons and Timeliness 
The time-scales considered relevant to purposive planning 
do not appear to have been intensively studied from a comparative 
viewpoint; and yet the choice of planning horizon is a reflection 
of two key assumptions. Firstly, it reflects an assumption about 
the internal dynamics of an organization or a system--how quickly 
it can achieve internal change, redeployment and redisposition of 
its forces and resources. Secondly, it reflects assumptions 
about the rates of change of the relevant factors in the environ- 
ment. Indeed, these two sets of assumptions are only the diag- 
onal elements in a 2x2 matrix whose off-diagonal terms are the 
assumptions about rates of change of the each way relationships 
between the organization and its environment (Emery and Trist 
1965). 
The relevance of these assumptions to the choice of planning 
horizon is illustrated by Figure 1. An organization forecasts 
or assumes the possibility of certain relevant future events 
(shown as El, E2, etc.). To each event, it can formulate an 
appropriate response. To produce the appropriate response for 
Ei requires a reaction time ti. Ideally a planning horizon T 
has to be chosen sufficiently far ahead that, prior to TI no 
events E are expected to arise to which the organization cannot i 
respond appropriately within a time t shorter than the interval i 
from now to the occurrence of Ei. Thus if the class of relevant 
events includes "market opportunities", and the relevant re- 
sponses are "product development" or "capacity expansion", the 
lead times for these processes will be relevant to the determina- 
tion of the planning horizon. 
Reaction Time 
'2'1' 
Reaction time 
f-- tl+ t I I I 
I > TIME 
Event Event rn 
I 
PRESENT 
Figure 1: Determination of Planning Horizon 
A t  a n  i n s t i n c t i v e  l e v e l ,  human i n d i v i d u a l s  and s o c i e t i e s  
must n e c e s s a r i l y  have  evolved  p a t t e r n s  o f  behaviour  conducive  
t o  t h e  long-term s u r v i v a l  of t h e  s p e c i e s .  Such p a t t e r n s  a r e  n o t  
s p e l t  o u t  a s  e x p l i c i t  s t r a t e g i c  p l a n s ,  b u t  a r e  e n s h r i n e d  i n  
s t a n d i n g  "norms" of  behav iour ,  and t h u s  a c q u i r e  a n  a p p a r e n t l y  
s t a t i c  and c o n s e r v a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r .  These norms would n a t u r a l l y  
come t o  comprise  such  r u l e s  a s  
"Do n o t  e a t  t h e  seed  c o r n "  
"Main ta in  a d e q u a t e  d e f e n c e  c a p a b i l i t y "  
a s  w e l l  a s  complex p a t t e r n s  o f  behaviour  such  a s  c r o p  r o t a t i o n ,  
s o c i a l  i n i t i a t i o n  r i tes,  t a b o o s  and r i t u a l s .  
T h i s  d u a l i t y  between g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d  " v a l u e s " ,  and t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  environment  t o  which t h e s e  v a l u e s  a r e  
a p p r o p r i a t e ,  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  F i g u r e  2. A t  b o t h  p e r s o n a l  and 
s o c i a l  l e v e l s ,  an  a t t r a c t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h i s  matching  o f  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  a  s t a b l e  s o c i e t y  i s  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n  
by J e a n  L i e d l o f f  (1975)  of  l i f e  and c h i l d - r e a r i n g  amongst t h e  
Yequana t r i b e  i n  t h e  Amazon jung le .  She g e n e r a l i z e s  h e r  percep-  
t i o n s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
"The human continuum can  b e  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  sequence  
of  e x p e r i e n c e  which co r re sponds  t o  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
and t e n d e n c i e s  of t h e  human s p e c i e s  i n  an  envi ronment  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h a t  i n  which t h o s e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and 
t e n d e n c i e s  w e r e  formed. I t  i n c l u d e s  a p p r o p r i a t e  
behaviour  i n ,  and t r e a t m e n t  by, o t h e r  peop le  a s  p a r t  
o f  t h a t  environment .  
a r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r :  
Environmental  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  
t i o n ,  d e c i s i o n - r u l e s ,  o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  t h r e a t s ,  
r a t e s  o f  change,  
and i n  s o c i e t i e s  n a t u r a l  c y c l e s  
g i v e  r ise t h rough  n a t u r a l  
s e l e c t i o n  t o :  
F i g u r e  2: The Match between Values  and Environment 
Expectation, in this sense, is founded as deeply in 
man as his very design. His lungs not only have, 
but can be said to be, an expectation of air, his 
eyes are an expectation of light rays of the specific 
range of wavelengths sent out by what is useful for 
him to see at the hours appropriate for his species 
to see them. His ears are an expectation of vibrations 
caused by the events most likely to concern him, 
including the voices of other people; and his own 
voice is an expectation of ears functioning similarly 
in them. The list can be extended indefinitely: 
waterproof skin and hair, expectation of rain; hairs 
in nose, expectation of dust; pigmentation in skin, 
expectation of sun; perspiratory mechanism, expecta- 
tion of heat; coagulatory mechanism, expectation of 
accidents to body surfaces; one sex, expectation of 
the other; reflex mechanism,.expectation of the need 
for speed of reaction in emergencies." 
Figure 2 and the example quoted assume a stable pattern-- 
not totally static, but if the environment is changing, it 
typically changes at. rates and in ways such that the habits 
of the dec.ision-makers can change sufficiently rapidly to 
maintain stability: the process is described by Ashby (1960) 
as "homeostasis", the total system as "ultrastable". 
Groups of human beings have always been significant 
elements of each other's relevant environments. The growth of 
the population and technological capabilities of human groups 
has steadily increased the speed and the magnitude of the 
changes they have induced in their own and others' environments. 
It has also introduced new kinds of changes. The preservation 
of our social fabric and living standards therefore requires 
our methods of decision to adapt to these faster, larger and 
novel changes. 
We can study the processes of adaptation at many levels, 
from the individual (e.g., Toffler, 1970) to the societal. 
A particularly rich and thoroughly considered literature exists 
for the processes as manifest in our economic organizations. 
Drucker (1958) has suggested that the corporation as it 
has developed over the last century or two has been unique 
amongst human institutions in seeking purposefully to create 
change (though the impulse towards territorial aggrandisement 
has similarities). The change in the nature of the corporation-- 
the evolution of its scale and structural complexity in response 
to the demands of its internal and external environments--have 
been well-documented by Chandler (1962). Here we are interested 
more in the concomitant evolution of the values and rules which 
inform its strategic decision-making. Ansoff (1965) draws 
extensively on Chandler in his formulation of a "quasi-analytic" 
approach to strategic planning. In his methodology, which has 
been widely influential, he structures the time dimension into 
a "proximate" period, and the "long term". The former is the 
period within which meaningful quantitative estimates can be 
made of return on investment (an objective chosen as a 
fundamental measure of the efficiency of the resource-conversion 
process). For the "long term", since return on investment cannot 
be directly estimated (because of uncertainty), he concentrates 
instead upon those factors which will contribute to the achieve- 
ment of strategic strength (and consequently "good" return on 
investment--whatever numerical level may be viewed as "good" in 
20 years' time). It is assumed that the correct identification 
of these factors is less uncertain than the prediction of quanti- 
tative performance. This approach to the setting of long-term 
strategic objectives is an important one. We refer to it below 
as "instrumental", since it emphasizes the building of the means 
to strategic success, the development of appropriate values, 
rather than the direct pursuit of short-term goals, or the 
spurious precision of exact long-term targets. This instrumental 
approach remains close to the standing norms of the primitive 
community, in establishing current rules and patterns chosen not 
only for immediate benefit, but for their presumed value to 
long-term performance and survival. In Ansoff's case, however, 
these rules are based not on tradition, but on an explicit 
consideration of the causal relationship between means and ends, 
in the context of perceptions, forecasts and assumptions con- 
cerning the dynamic behaviour of the environment. Effective 
instrumental development shortens reaction times. 
A noticeable feature of strategic planning methodology over 
the past 30 years has been the expansion of the planning period 
to longer-term time horizons, and it is interesting to consider 
the reasons for this in the terms of Figure 1. The scale of 
organizations, of their component activities, and of the projects 
lying within human capability, have all increased; and these 
increases have been generally accompanied by a corresponding 
incrdase in the "reaction time" required to bring such projects 
to fruition. Gold (1978) has documented the strategic and 
technological success of the Japanese iron and steel industry, 
and identifies as one of the key contributory factors the per- 
sistent willingness to "take the long view"; which he contrasts 
with the behaviour in the U.S. arid Western Europe. 
Such changes are predominantly within what we have called 
the internal dynamics of the organization. The construction 
of a petrochemical complex, the infrastructure of a new town, 
or the development of manned space-flight are decisions by 
unitary agencies to commit in a particular way the resources 
under their control. They are lengthy projects, and their 
"appropriateness" as "reactions" to postulated future "events" 
(to use our earlier terminology) depends upon their relevant 
environments. Thus the growth of time-scale in projects and 
associated planning horizons is a reflection also of changes 
(actual or assumed) in the nature of the environment. Since, 
for many human institutions, other organizations and their 
activities are amongst the most significant features of their 
environments, the fact that organizations have grown in scale 
and in the scale of their activities itself constitutes relevant 
environmental change for each organization. 
The examples discussed above are of individuals, human 
groups, and economic organizations. These are instructive, 
but the lessons learnt are not directly transferable to the 
scale of countries and supranational activities. TO do that, 
we need to move to the abstract analysis represented by Figure 1. 
In the terms of that figure, the relevant events, the appro- 
priate responses and the reaction times have their interpreta- 
tion at each level, from the individual up to global systems. 
The problem to which we seek to draw attention is that our 
familiarity and competence with the largest scale problems, 
even our willingness to perceive and discuss them, may be 
developing less rapidly than the need to tackle them. Figure 3 
shows some examples. 
Changes in the character of strategic environment will 
require changes in our approaches to strategic planning, 
especially at large-scale levels, and a critical and continuing 
attempt must be undertaken, to discriminate between those values 
and techniques whose worth is invariant, and those which must 
be modified (or developed where non-existent) to adapt to the 
demands of the new environme.nt. To the nature of the new envi- 
ronment we return in 2.3 below. The process of strategic adapta- 
tion and societal learning will be a slow one; we consider it 
further in the following section. 
2.2 Assumptions, Strategic Plodels, and the Need for Strategic 
Control and Societal Learning 
R.H. Tawney remarked that the most important characteristics 
of a man are the things he takes for granted. It is instinctive 
and fundamental to assume constancy, to seek to maintain it and 
to restore it if disturbed, to aim at Schon's "stable state" 
(1971), and to "manage by exception". Yet to cherish one's 
fundamental assumptions, unquestioned and unchallenged, is to 
risk drifting unprepared into a situation in which their revision 
is forced at unpalatable speed. We are prone to cling to the 
assumptions embodied in our strategic perceptions, our accepted 
models, long after they have been rendered obsolete by a changing 
environment. 
The process has been documented in many fields. Schon's 
description of many of the federal agencies of the U.S. as 
"bureaucracies which are memorials to old problems" (1971) sums 
up the consequence. The diagnosis has been formulated by spe- 
cialists in many disciplines, in fundamentally similar terms. 
Thus Coleman (1978) on U.K. land-use policy: 
"Land-use planning was the only type of planning 
mentioned in the 1947 Act, and planners were expected 
to monitor the results of their decisions by producing 
up-to-date,land-use maps every five years. This they 
have signally failed to do." 
Burgess (1977), in an excellent critique of U.K. education 
policy, points out that 
"In politics and social affairs generally we are all 
too ready to leap to a solution, and we often persist 
in the solution, regardless of its irrelevance to our 
pressing problems. 'I 
Level 
Individual or 
family 
Corporation 
Country 
Western 
Europe 
Displacement/obsolescence 
of current product, process 
or market, due to social/ 
technological change 
Example of "Event" 1 Appropriate responses 
requiring anticipation I 
Orderly withdrawal from 
existing activities with 
capital recovery, invest- 
ment in product develop- 
ment and market research, 
diversification and in- 
vestment in new areas 
Redundancy from current 
employment 
Continuing loss of market 
share in world market for 
manufactured goods 
Re-training, re-location, 
etc. 
Stimulation of industrial 
capability and compet 
itiveness; and/or reduc- 
tion of dependence upon 
imports 
Exhaustion of local oil 
supplies, and oil import 
dependence reaching an 
unacceptable level 
Conserve and economise 
in consumption of energy; 
R&D in alternative and 
and renewable energy 
sources; maintain and 
expand coal capability; 
change life-styles of 
population 
Reaction time 
3 to 12 months 
2 to 10 years 
~- 
5 to 30 years 
10 to 50 years 
Consequence of failure 
to react 
Unemployment, abrupt 
fall in living stan- 
dard 
Loss of sales, profits 
decline, loss of jobs, 
bankruptcy 
- - . . -- -  - - - - - - - 
Relative or absolute 
fall in standard of 
living; social dis- 
content; rising 
emigration of skill 
and talent 
- 
Rising oil-import 
dependence, run-down 
coal industry, loss 
of industrial output, 
unemployment, social 
unrest, strategic 
vulnerability. 
Figure 3. Multi-level examples of structural dynamics. 
Drawing on Popper (19591, Burgess argues 
"The task for the social and natural scientist is one 
of trial and error; of inventing hypotheses which can 
be practically tested and of submitting them to these 
tests. In most current practice the trial is unmoni- 
tored, the error explained away." 
We have discussed at greater length elsewhere (Cantley, 
1978) the nature of strategic monitoring and control, with 
particular reference to health care, but general relevance to 
any, public sector planning. We defined 
"monitoring as the process of .information-gathering 
by which the organization checks both its performance 
relative to targets, and the behaviour of the environ- 
ment, assumptions about which formed part of the basis 
for the plan and the targets. Control actions result 
from the monitoring, and are typically: 
(a) to change current actions to ensure closer 
alignment with plan; 
(b) to re-interpret plan targets in light of 
latest environmental information, and then 
as (a) above. (Plan targets are often set 
in relative terms. e . s . .  "units Der thousand < .  & 
population", so that absolute terms, e.g., 
"units" require an environmental input to 
fix them). 
At a higher level, other results of monitoring may be: 
(c) to discover whether an assumption made as a 
basis for planning (e.g., a postulated relation- 
ship) has in fact proved correct; if in fact 
it is wrong, or a more accurate assumption is 
now available, an adjustment to plan may be 
made; 
(d) to discover that even the perfect achievement 
of a planned target is not found to be satis- 
factory, e.g., because it has not contributed 
towards the policy objective to which it was 
supposedly related. The target may then be 
abandoned, modified or replaced and action 
as in (a) initiated. 
On all levels, the results and possible control 
actions (a) to (d) above have their interpretations. 
At the strategic level, the necessary actions are the 
least likely to be capable of immediate implementation, 
since by definition they require the widest view of 
implications and the greatest authority over both 
resources and policy objectives." 
On broad, supra-national strategic issues such as those 
concerned with European integration, there is no formal strategic 
monitoring system to promote actions in categories (c) and (dl 
above. We must therefore depend upon and contribute to the 
processes of independent public investigation, debate and crit- 
icism; which can themselves constitute the monitoring system 
which should be one of an open society's greatest strengths. 
One of the greatest menaces to this process of societal learning 
is the entrenched conservatism--whether deliberate or unconscious-- 
of the professional groups who view the area of debate as their 
preserve. Krause (1973) has described how comprehensive health 
care planning in the U.S. has been repeatedly vitiated by these 
forces: "health planning cannot operate in the present socio- 
political context except as an ideology to justify the status 
quo in health services". 
In the context of this paper, we shall discuss as our central 
example a question of strategic economic management. No less in 
that field do we find the failure or absence of strategic moni- 
toring; as Gunnar Myrdal (1967) expresses it in the prologue to 
his epic Asian Drama: 
"Economic theorists, more than other social scientists, 
have long been disposed to arrive at general propositions 
and then postulate them as valid for every time, place 
and culture. ... For such confidence in the constructs 
of economic reasoning, there is no empirical justifica- 
tion. ... we have inherited from classical economics a 
treasury of theorfes that are regularly posited with 
more general claims than they warrant. The very concepts 
used in their construction aspire to a universal applica- 
bility that they do not in fact possess." 
Before entering the example, we shall introduce some terms 
we need to describe the nature of the organizational environments 
against which our strategic planning and control systems have to 
pursue adaptation. 
2.3 The Causal Texture of Environments 
For the general discussion of strategic adaptation, the 
classification of types of environment by Emery and Trist (1965) 
is helpful. Drawing on the work of many other authors in a 
variety of disciplines, they summarize four ideal types of 
environment. These four serve as theoretical points, probably 
never found in practice in their pure forms; but they add to our 
language of description for the various mixed or transitional 
types of real-world environment we encounter. Moreover, it is 
possible to consider at the theoretical level the forms of 
strategic response likely to be more or less appropriate to the 
different environments. 
Type 1, the placid, randomized environment, is the simplest. 
In this, benefits and dangers are randomly distributed through- 
out the space in which an entity is pursuing its objectives. It 
cannot do better than simply moving towards the benefits and 
away from the dangers which lie within its current field of 
perception. Tactics are simple; strategy redundant. 
Type 2, the placid, clustered environment, differs from 
the randomized by the existence of detectable structure in the 
environmental distribution of benefits and dangers. Consequently 
the possibility exists for the entity to develop its powers of 
organization and perception and its structure to take advantage 
of these environmental characteristics. The result is growth 
of scale and complexity, and the opportunity for strategic as 
well as tactical moves. 
In the disturbed, reactive environment, Type 3 ,  the placid 
clustered environment becomes complicated by the existence of 
other purposeful entities sharing the same environment. Thus 
the actions of each party have to take account of the interac- 
tions with other parties as well as with the environment. Under 
these conditions, there is further incentive to the growth of 
scale, and to other dimensions of activity (e.g., R. and D ex- 
penditure) whereby advantage may be gained over other partici- 
pants. 
In the turbulent field, Type 4, the behaviour developed to 
cope with the conditions of the disturbed reactive environment 
leads to changes in the environment itself--aspects which cohld 
previously be taken as fixed (e.g., climate, the natural eco- 
system, the legal and institutional environment, fundamentals 
of social custom and behaviour) start to shift. 
As metaphors, models or paradigms for a discussion of 
economic and political structures and systems in the twentieth 
century, it is clear that the latter two types of environment 
are the most relevant. One can trace the parallel concepts in 
the work of many writers--e.g., Schon (1971) in his description 
of the lass of the "stable state", for which we as individuals 
and groups continue instinctively to seek. Ashby (1960) in 
his discussion of biological adaptation stresses the role of 
connectedness and constancies in determining the ease or diffi- 
culty of adaptation to an environment. "Constancies cut a 
system to pieces", enabling one to adapt piecewise, one problem 
at a time; increasing connectedness (the extreme example being 
like a combination lock) demand simultaneous adaptation to many 
variables. In international negotiations, bilateral agreements 
are more easily achieved and kept than multilateral; a sequence 
of bilateral agreements would be much more difficult to achieve 
if each subsequent negotiation had to relate to or modify the 
terms of the earlier agreements. The environmental types 
introduced above are in order of increasing connectedness, the 
most complex being the turbulent field. 
It is our contention in this paper that the concepts 
introduced are usable for the practical analysis of large-scale 
strategic problems. We illustrate this contention by turning 
in the following section to the contemporary macro-economic 
problems of the Western European economies, and to some of the 
rival prescriptions for resolving these problems. 
Some a s p e c t s  o f  t h e s e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  may be  compared w i t h  
t h e  a b s t r a c t  a n a l y s e s  of  env i ronmen t  w e  have i n t r o d u c e d ,  and 
w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l  a p p r o a c h e s  t o  c o p i n g  w i t h  s u c h  e n v i r o n m e n t s  
which Emery ( 1 9 6 7 )  a n d  o t h e r s  have  d i s c u s s e d ;  w e  r e t u r n  t o  
t h e s e  i n  3 . 6  below. 
3. THE CASE STUDY: AN OLD SOLUTION, TWO EUROPEAN PROBLEMS 
AND A NEW SOLUTION 
3.1 The Liberal, Integrated, Free ~rade Model -- 
Economic activity and organization are scarcely separable 
from political organization, least of all at strategic levels 
and time-scales. Of the decision-rules or values most pervasively 
established in the economic and political life of Western Europe, 
few are more profoundly held--in theory--than the collection of 
economic doctrines known as liberalism, free trade, or the open 
market system. A consistent and passionate defender of these 
values has been the U.K. weekly "Economist", whose current 
promotional publicity proudly informs us that it was "founded 
in 1843 ... to promote liberal reform and the repeal of the Corn 
Laws". The religious intensity with which this faith was held 
is evident in an article that year (Economist, 1843; quoted by 
Calleo and Rowland, 1973): 
"Free trade is itself a good, like virtue, holiness 
and righteousness, to be loved, admired, honoured and 
steadfastly adopted, for its own sake, though all the 
rest of the world should love restrictions and prohibi- 
tions, which are of themselves evils, like vice and 
crime, to be hated and abhorred under all circumstances 
and at all times." 
The power and conviction of such language brook no excep- 
tions--the "infant industry" argument is not yet born, and the 
biblical phrases repudiate the possibility that the Economist 
might be pleading the case of a sectional interest in a partic- 
ular country at a specific time, with certain tangible advantages 
in industrial capability over its trading partners. 
An indication of the contemporary success of this doctrine 
is the preamble to the Treaty of Rome (1957), whose signatories 
"1. Determined to lay the foundations of an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, 
2. Resolved to ensure the economic and social prog- 
ress of their countries by common action to 
eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, 
3. Affirminq as the essential objective of their 
efforts the constant improvement of the living 
and working conditions of their peoples, 
4. Recognizinq that the removal of existing obsta- 
cles calls for concerted action in order to 
guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and 
fair competition, 
5. Anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies 
and to ensure their harmonious development by 
reducing the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backwardness of the 
less favoured regions, 
6 .  D e s i r i n g  t o  c o n t r i b u t e ,  by means o f  a  common 
commercial  p o l i c y ,  t o  t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  a b o l i t i o n  
o f  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  
7. I n t e n d i n q  t o  con f i rm  t h e  s o l i d a r i t y  which b i n d s  
Europe and t h e  o v e r s e a s  c o u n t r i e s  and d e s i r i n g  t o  
e n s u r e  t h e  development of  t h e i r  p r o s p e r i t y ,  i n  
acco rdance  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  t h e  C h a r t e r  o f  
t h e  Un i t ed  N a t i o n s ,  
8 .  Resolved by t h u s  poo l ing  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  t o  
s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  c a u s e  of  peace  and l i b e r t y ,  and 
c a l l i n g  upon t h e  o t h e r  p e o p l e s  of  Europe who 
s h a r e  t h e i r  i d e a l  t o  j o i n  i n  t h e i r  e f f o r t s ,  
9. Have d e c i d e d  t o  c r e a t e  a  European Economic 
Community ..." 
( P e a s l e e  ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  numbers added by u s  f o r  r e f e r e n c e ) .  Few would 
wish  t o  a r g u e  w i t h  t h e  worthy o b j e c t i v e s  of  p h r a s e s  1 ,  3 ,  5 ,  7  
and 8 .  But p h r a s e s  2 ,  4 and  6 r e f l e c t  t h e  s t r a t e g i c  assumpt ion  
t h a t  economic l i b e r a l i s m  w i l l  be  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  means t o  t h e  
achievement  of  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s .  T h i s  assumpt ion  i s  s i m i l a r l y  
c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  ph i lo sophy  o f  t h e  OECD, whose founding  c o n v e n t i o n  
s t i p u l a t e s  t h e  promotion o f  " p o l i c i e s  d e s i g n e d  
-- t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  h i g h e s t  s u s t a i n a b l e  economic growth  and 
and  employment and a  r i s i n g  s t a n d a r d  of  l i v i n g  i n  
member c o u n t r i e s  .... 
-- to  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  expans ion  o f  world t r a d e  on a  
m u l t i l a t e r a l ,  non -d i sc r imina to ry  b a s i s  i n  acco rdance  
w i t h  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s . "  
The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  r e f e r r e d  t o  would i n c l u d e  commit- 
ments t o  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Monetary Fund ( d a t i n g  from B r e t t o n  
Woods, 1944) and t h e  Gene ra l  Agreement on ~ a r i f f s  and Trade ,  
whose seven  major  t a r i f f  c o n f e r e n c e s  s i n c e  1947 have t h e  d e c l a r e d  
aim o f  " p r o g r e s s i v e l y  d i s m a n t l i n g  b a r r i e r s  t o  wor ld  t r a d e " .  
I t  w i l l  b e  a rgued  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  
s t r a t e g i c  assumpt ion  i n  t h e  t r e a t y  of  Rome, t h e  OECD and GATT 
p o l i c i e s ,  d o e s  n o t  i n  f a c t  have g e n e r a l  v a l i d i t y ;  and i n  p a r t i -  
c u l a r  may a c t u a l l y  l i m i t  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  t h e  
p u r s u i t  o f  t h e  p r o f e s s e d  o b j e c t i v e s .  Having made t h i s  p o i n t ,  
w e  c a n  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  more g e n e r a l  p o i n t  t h a t  w e  need t o  d e v e l o p  
t h e  h a b i t  o f  making e x p l i c i t  t h e  p r o v i s i o n a l  s t a t u s  o f  o u r  
s t r a t e g i c  a s sumpt ions ,  and b u i l d i n g  t h e  m o n i t o r i n g  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  r ev i ew them. 
3.2 -- and i t s  Shor tcomings  
The l i b e r a l  economic sys t em h a s  been a  c o r n e r s t o n e  of  
economic t h e o r i s t s  from Adam Smith and R ica rdo  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  
day.  R ica rdo  e l u c i d a t e d  t h e  s imp le  a l g e b r a  o f  t h e  law o f  
compara t ive  advan tage ,  by which each  c o u n t r y  shou ld  s p e c i a l i z e  
in those things in which its relative efficiency is greatest, 
in order to maximize the total welfare; international trade 
would therefore increase the welfare of each party. His classic 
example of cloth and wine trade between England and Portugal 
has been widely quoted. 20th century econonists--Becksher, 
Ohlin, Stolper and Samuelson elaborated further theorems on the 
same foundations, showing inter alia that 
--
1. free trading of goods can be a substitute for the 
movement of labour and capital; 
2. trade thus leads to international equalization of 
wages and interest rates 
3. trade must consequently reduce or eliminate inequali- 
ties in living standards. 
Kaldor (1978) has pointed out the artificial assumptions 
on which this theory has rested, from Ricardo onwards: 
1. The "production function", i.e., technology and the 
efficiency of its exploitation, the same everywhere; 
2. Perfect competition 
3. Constant returns to scale (homogeneous and linear 
production functions). 
In agriculture, returns to scale of production eventually 
diminish as the limits of suitable land and useful inputs are 
reached; thus in Ricardo's two-pro'duct model, although Portugal 
may specialize in wine, there will be limits to the labour that 
viticulture can absorb. In industry, it is familiar that over 
a wide range, there exist increasing returns to scale; thus 
--
again in Ricardo's model, the English cloth producers will make 
it impossible to produce cloth in Portugal; the Portuguese 
textile trade will be ruined. Nor will it be saved by reducing 
wages, since there is a minimum wage (in terms of other commod- 
ities) below which the cloth workers could not subsist. 
Friedrich List pointed out that this was the actual outcome of 
the Methuen Treaty of 1704 between England and Portugal. 
Calleo and Rowland (1973) have given an excellent history 
of the evolution of free trade ideology on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and we draw freely on their work below. 
"Ricardo's ideas had a rather special application 
to Britain's politics in the early and middle nine- 
teenth century. The British had gained a formidable 
lead over other nations in industry and commerce; 
British manufacturers were more than capable of 
competing favourably in any open market. British 
industrialists naturally hoped to extend and consoli- 
date their position as 'th.e workshop of the world"'. 
Internally, the rapid and forced transformation of British 
agriculture caused social distress, and criticism by humanist 
conservatives. Coleridge, Disraeli and others attacked the 
disruption of rural society for the sake of cheap food and low 
industrial wages; but they lost the argument. Externally, the 
pragmatic Americans remained protected not only by geography and 
high tariffs, but by an unregenerate nationalist mercantilism. 
The American economist, Henry Carey, denounced free trade as 
Britain's policy to perpetuate her supremacy and reduce all 
agricultural states to permanent tributaries. Gradually, the 
European states returned to mercantilism, emboldened by the 
works of the Swabian-American Friedrich List. List argued that 
while free trade was the natural view of a powerful developed 
nation, for a nation seeking to develop its industries, it was 
a short-sighted policy which sacrificed long-range national 
interests and productive power. He emphasized productive power 
as "infinitely more important than wealth itself", rather than 
increased consumption. We may note the similarity to the 
strategic "instrumentalism" of Ansoff previously discussed. 
The successful and protected development of Germany, Japan 
and the United States in the latter decades of the nineteenth 
century give clear support to List's analysis; and it is fuzzily 
accepted even by liberal economists today that the case for 
protection at least of "infant industries" exists. 
Calleo and Rowland sum up how, "when faced with the com- 
petitive challenge of the new industrial states, Britain 
established a vast free-trade empire with the world's non- 
industrial economies. In other words, Britain responded, not by 
struggling to retain her industrial superiority, but rather by 
exploiting to the full her historical advantage in the under- 
developed areas of the world." The results of Britain's failure 
to maintain and modernize her industrial capability, and her 
retention of the geographically extended imperial role, were 
all too sharply identified by both the outbreaks of war, that 
severest technical audit. Corelli Barnett (1972) has assembled 
and presented the historical evidence in detail; the lead times 
shown in Figure 3 may be under- rather than over-stated. 
All this history remains of central relevance to the con- 
tinuing debate about liberalism v. protectionism of various 
forms. For the debate is not only about the mathematical models 
of theoretical economics, but also about the nature of the 
international trading environment, and the validity of some of 
the assumptions about production capability. 
On the nature of the international environment, Keynes, 
writing in 1933, was clear on the need to revise his strategic 
fundamentals: 
"I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect 
free trade not only as an economic doctrine which a 
rational and instructed person could not doubt, but 
almost as a part of the moral law. ... I thought 
~ngland's unshakable free trade convictions, main- 
tained for nearly a hundred years, to be both the 
e x p l a n a t i o n  b e f o r e  man and t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  b e f o r e  
Ileaven o f  h e r  economic supremacy. ... 
I t  i s  a  long  b u s i n e s s  t o  s h u f f l e  o u t  o f  t h e  
menta l  h a b i t s  of  t h e  pre-war n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  world 
... But e x p e r i e n c e  i s  accumula t ing  t h a t  remoteness  
between ownersh ip  and o p e r a t i o n  i s  an  e v i l  i n  t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  among men, l i k e l y  o r  c e r t a i n  i n  t h e  long  
r u n  t o  s e t  up s t r a i n s  and e n m i t i e s  which w i l l  b r i n g  
t o  nought  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  c a l c u l a t i o n .  ... l e t  goods be  
homespun whenever i t  i s  r easonab ly  and c o n v e n i e n t l y  
p o s s i b l e ,  and,  above a l l ,  l e t  f i n a n c e  be p r i m a r i l y  
n a t i o n a l .  Exper ience  accumula tes  t o  prove  t h a t  
most modern p r o c e s s e s  of  mass p roduc t ion  can  be  
performed i n  most c o u n t r i e s  and climates w i t h  a lmos t  
e q u a l  e f f i c i e n c y  ... W e  do n o t  wish t o  be  a t  t h e  mercy 
o f  world f o r c e s  working o u t ,  o r  t r y i n g  t o  work o u t  
some uni form e q u i l i b r i u m  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  i d e a l  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  i f  t h e y  can  be  c a l l e d  such ,  of l a i s s e z -  
f a i r e  c a p i t a l i s m .  ... t h e  p o l i c y  of a n  i n c r e a s e d  
n a t i o n a l  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y  is t o  be  c o n s i d e r e d ,  n o t  as 
an  i d e a l  i n  i t s e l f ,  b u t  as d i r e c t e d  t o  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
of an environment  i n  which o t h e r  i d e a l s  can  be  s a f e l y  
and c o n v e n i e n t l y  pursued .  ... w e  have u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  
conce ivcd  it a  mora l  d u t y  t o  r u i n  t h c  t i l lc rs  of  t h e  
s o i l  and t o  d e s t r o y  t h e  age-long human t r a d i t i o n s  
a t t e n d a n t  on husbandry,  i f  w e  could  g e t  a  l o a f  o f  
b read  t h e r e b y  a t e n t h  of a penny cheape r . "  
Echoes o f  Disraeli!  
I n  t h e  environment  of t h e  1970s and 1980s,  t h e  fundamental  
i s s u e s  remain u n a l t e r e d .  Meadows (1979) h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  how 
t h e  U . S .  energy-import  p a t t e r n  of l ong-d i s t ance  t a n k e r  r o u t e s  
u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  t r u e  c o s t  of o i l - - s i n c e  t h e  c o s t s  of m a i n t a i n i n g  
adequa te  s e c u r i t y  of  supp ly  a r e  borne  by t h e  Department o f  
Defence. I n  h i s  work on wood-fired e l e c t r i c i t y  g e n e r a t i n g  p l a n t  
i n  Vermont, h e  h a s  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h e  f a i l u r e  of c o n v e n t i o n a l  
economic c r i t e r i a  t o  t a k e  accoun t  of t h e  f u l l  w i t h i n - s t a t e  
b e n e f i t s  of  l o c a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  
The s t a n d a r d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f r e e  t r a d e  model, a s  L i s t  
p o i n t e d  o u t ,  makes many s t r o n g  assumpt ions ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n t e r -  
n a t i o n a l  and domes t i c  peace  a s  a g i v e n  c o n d i t i o n  of  i t s  a n a l y s i s .  
I n  t h e  r e a l  wor ld ,  n a t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  obv ious ly  cou ld  n o t  b e  
t aken  f o r  g r a n t e d .  L i s t  a rgued  t h a t ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  of s e c u r i t y ,  
s t a t e s  shou ld  n o t  be  o v e r l y  dependent  on o t h e r  s ta tes ,  and 
shou ld  t h e r e f o r e  s t r i v e  f o r  a  ba l anced  and r e l a t i v e l y  s e l f -  
s u f f i c i e n t  economy. Domes t i ca l ly ,  L l s t  a l s o  saw economic 
a c t i v i t y  a s  a  g r e a t  " c o l l a b o r a t i o n "  o f  l a b o u r  w i t h i n  a smoothly 
f u n c t i o n i n g  s o c i a l  system. E s s e n t i a l  t o  t h i s  c o l l a b o r a t i o n  was 
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  p e a c e f u l ,  p r o t e c t e d  community, which c o n t a i n e d  
n o t  o n l y  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  s k i l l s ,  b u t  a l s o  t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  p u t  them 
t o  work. 
Notwithstanding the circumstances of his time, List foresaw 
a stage in European development when free trade would become 
beneficial; but according to Calleo, List's view was that "a 
plural system can remain open only insofar as it does not unduly 
threaten the cohesion and self-determination of the national 
units". 
Calleo and Rowland's model of interstate political systems 
is readable either as a contribution to general system theory, 
or as a good descriptive fit to history. We start from some of 
their definitions: 
"By a system we mean a group of closely interrelated 
or interdependent states. We characterize as imperial 
an international political system with one dominant 
power and with the other states in some considerable 
degree of dependence and constraint... 
... a plural interstate system is composed of 
closely related powers, sufficiently equal in resources 
and pretensions so that none is able or perhaps even 
willing to exercise overlordship over the others. Such 
a system normally organizes its relations around concep- 
tions of a balance of power and rules of the game-- 
models and precepts designed to moderate competition 
and prevent hegemony ... 
Federalism introduces several variations in these 
interstate models and their governing ideologies. A 
federal system seeks the unifying order and certainty 
of an imperial system, but without the hegemonic 
domination by a single state. Unity is sustained 
either by placing over the constituent states a 
supranational "federal" authority, designed to 
represent the federation as a whole rather than any 
of its units in particular, or else by establishing 
a confederal arrangement among the constituent states, 
designed to engage them in an organized procedure for 
making and carrying out certain decisions collectively. 
The United States after 1789 gives an example of the 
first kind of attempted federal system; the Common 
Market today gives an example of the second ... 
These patterns of political relations have their 
economic equivalents ... an international political 
order that is plural has a tendency toward economic 
protectionism among its parts. Nations wishing to 
maintain national political self-determination also 
wish to avoid economic dependency." 
Calleo (op. cit. and 1974a, b) points out that modern 
industrial states are mercantilist rather than liberal domes- 
tically, in the acceptance by government of active responsibility 
for shaping and managing the economy, promoting growth and main- 
taining employment. 
"A liberal economic system among nations nowadays can 
no longer base itself on free trade and convertibility 
alone, but demands as well considerable sustained and 
organized cooperation among governments. .. Hence the 
Common Market, a customs union which sustains a liberal 
plural economic relationship among domestically 
mercantilist states, has required increasingly elaborate 
intergovernmental machinery, including a separate 
bureaucracy with independent powers." 
To operational researchers, the liberal economist's model 
is familiar in the guise of the convicts' dilemma, translated 
into the terms of Figure 4. On this model, GATT negotiations, 
Common Markets and similar activities represent an attempt to 
build the trust and cooperation to bring all parties into the 
top left-hand corner, and prevent defections into the adjacent 
boxes. Each partner is tempted to defect from the agreement, 
but is inhibited by the general fear of the bottom right. It 
is a crude, simple model, whose validity depends on assumptions 
increasingly questionable; in particular it ignores the dynamic 
aspects of scale economies in the growth of industrial capability 
at all stages. Some examples of these are discussed below. 
Reference has been made to the "infant industry" argument. 
This is essentially about dynamics, which is why Ricardo's 
model fails to include it; for his production function ignores 
returns to scale. Returns to scale are often thought of in 
static terms, but the evidence of the "learning curve" and 
consequently of "dominant market share", which are well substan- 
tiated by empirical evidence'in a variety of industries, lead 
to a dynamically increasing advantage of scale determined by 
cumulative production. In its simplest form, it leads naturally 
to monopoly, since nobody could ever catch up with the effi- 
ciency of the first producer: van der Rijst's (1978) diagram 
(reproduced as Figure 5) is a good example. In practice, 
Figure 4. "Convicts' Dilemma" Model of International Trade 
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natural barriers of transport cost, and other advantages of 
proximity to customers, possibly supplemented by deliberate 
protection, make the pure global monopoly case unlikely; and 
for developing countries, even the liberal economists accept the 
case for some protection to build up domestic industry. 
Moreover, few countries which have struggled to build up a 
domestic manufacturing capability will tolerate its subsequent 
elimination by foreign competition, even once its infancy is 
over. Vietorisz (1974) gives a good illustration of this in 
his description of the Mexican electric motor industry, in a 
paper which also has much to say about the inadequacies of 
"comparative advantage" in allowing for the dynamic and 
structural aspects of industrial development: 
"..:.technology transfer ... appears as a means of 
perpetuating dependency, or contrariwise, breaking 
out of it. ... Something crucial is evidently left 
out of the comparative advantage model--namely, the 
analysis of the development of the institutional 
structure supporting industrialization and technolog- 
ical progress, which has a sequential character, 
reflected in the sequence of introduction of electric 
motors of progressively larger size and progressively 
greater technical complexity." 
Vietoriszalso quotes the nineteenth century U.S. and Japanese 
experience; then returning to his theme of third-world develop- 
ment problems, on which he was working for the U.N., comments 
"The enormous weight of economic tradition supporting 
the comparative advantage principle makes it difficult 
to define effective criteria... Advice given under the 
traditional point of view is likely to transfer tech- 
nology in such a way as to perpetuate dependency rather 
than help break out of it. Yet the protagonists of 
these views have the most impeccable academic creden- 
tials from some of the world's leading institutions of 
higher education. " 
What the liberal economists fail sufficiently to allow for 
is the changed structure of the world environment since their 
theories were developed. Hobsbawm ( 1968 )  brought this difference 
out in his history of Britain's industrial revolution: 
"...problems which are acute in modern underdeveloped 
countries setting about their industrialization were 
mild in eighteenth-century Britain. ... transport and 
communications were comparatively easy and cheap, since 
no part of Britain is further than seventy miles from 
the sea, and even less from some navigable waterway. 
The technological problems of the early Industrial 
Revolution were fairly simple. They required no class 
of men with specialized scientific qualifications, but 
merely a sufficiency of men with ordinary literacy, 
familiarity with simple mechanical devices and the 
working of metals, practical experience and initiative. 
The centuries since 1500  had certainly provided such a 
supply. Most of the new technical inventions and 
productive establishments could be started economically 
on a small scale, and expanded piecemeal by successive 
addition. That is to say, they required little initial 
investment, and their expansion could be financed out 
of accumulated profits. Industrial development was 
within the capacities of a multiplicity of small 
entrepreneurs and skilled traditional artisans. No 
twentieth-qentury country setting about industrializa- 
tion has, or can have, anything like these advantages." 
However, the "infant industry" case of initial industrial 
development is by no means the only case to which dynamic 
economies of scale are relevant. Kaldor ( 1978 )  has usefully 
clarified this in the paper already referred to, where he 
points out the unrealistic assumptions of the classic inter- 
national trade theory. 
"The present division of the world between rich and 
poor countries is a relatively recent phenomenon: 
it is due to the fact that the countries which 
successfully industrialized accumulated a great 
deal of material and human capital in the course of 
industrialization. All developed countries are 
invariably successful producers and exporters of 
manufactured goods. The phenomenon of 'polarisation' 
happens w i t h i n  a s  w e l l  a s  between c o u n t r i e s - - t h e  c l a s s i c  
example i s  t h a t  o f  t h e  North and South o f  I t a l y  which 
f o l l o w i n g  u n i f i c a t i o n  h a s  shown a  s t r o n g l y  d i v e r g e n t  
deve lopmen t - -un i f i ca t ion  s e r v e d  t o  e n r i c h  t h e  North and 
t o  impover i sh  t h e  South.  
Thus i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o r  i n t e r r e g i o n a l  t r a d e  i s  c a p a b l e  
of  e n l a r g i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  l i v i n g  s t a n d a r d s  between 
a r e a s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  d i m i n i s h i n g  them. Both f o r c e s  o p e r a t e ,  
t h e  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  i s  which of  t h e s e  two t e n d e n c i e s  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  predomina te?  
W e  c a n  d i s t i n g u i s h  between t h r e e  t y p e s  o f  t r a d e : -  
( 1 )  t r a d e  between manufac tu r ing  c o u n t r i e s  and 
pr imary  p roduce r s ;  
( 2 )  t r a d e  between manufac tu r ing  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  
e a c h  o t h e r ;  
( 3 )  t r a d e  between pr imary  p r o d u c e r s  w i t h  each  
o t h e r .  
I t  i s  o n l y  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  t h i r d  t y p e  o f  t r a d e  
t h a t  t h e  c l a s s i c a l  t h e o r y  o f  mutua l  advantage  s t r i c t l y  
a p p l i e s .  Depending on  c l i m a t e  etc.  it pays  some 
c o u n t r i e s  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on p roduc ing  wheat o r  p o t a t o e s  
and o t h e r s  on  o r a n g e s  and bananas .  A s  r e g a r d s  t h e  
f i r s t  t y p e  of t rade--whether  it i s  t h e  exchange of 
wine a g a i n s t  c l o t h  o r  raw c o t t o n  a g a i n s t  c o t t o n  s h i r t s - -  
t h e  b e n e f i t s  f r o m  t r a d e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  d i s p r o p o r t i o n -  
a t e l y  l a r g e  for  t h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  which impor t  raw 
m a t e r i a l s  and e x p o r t  manufac tu re s .  
The i n t e r e s t i n g  c a s e  i s  t r a d e  o f  t h e  second type-- 
t r a d e  between manufac tu r ing  c o u n t r i e s  which h a s  g r e a t l y  
i n t e n s i f i e d  s i n c e  World War 11, t h u s  r e v e r s i n g  t h e  
t r e n d  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f i f t y  y e a r s  which was towards  
more ' a u t a r k y '  a s  between t h e  l e a d i n g  powers. 
I n  p r i n c i p l e  such  t r a d e  i s  o f  g r e a t  p r a c t i c a l  
b e n e f i t  s i n c e  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  between t h e  i n d u s t r i e s  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  shou ld  e n a b l e  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  t h e  
economies of  s c a l e  t o  b e  r e a l i z e d  more f u l l y .  However 
t h e  t r u t h  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  depends on t h e  t r a d e  
b e i n g  b a l a n c e d  i n  both.  d i r e c t i o n s - - a  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s  
i n  which t h e  e x p o r t s  o f  manufac tu re s  of  each  c o u n t r y  
i n c r e a s e  p a r i  pas su  w i t h  i t s  i m p o r t s  of manufac tu re s .  
But a s  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e ,  b o t h  pre-war and post-war ,  h a s  
shown, t h i s  d o e s  n o t  come a b o u t  n a t u r a l l y .  Growing 
imbalances  of t r a d e  may a r i s e  which a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  
c o r r e c t e d .  A f t e r  t h e  second World War t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  
c o u n t r i e s  l i k e  Germany and Japan  a c q u i r e d  a  c u m u l a t i v e  
advan tage  th rough  t h e i r  f a s t  growth,  whereas  t h e  s l o w -  
growing c o u n t r i e s  such  a s  B r i t a i n  (and  t o  s o m e  e x t e n t  
a l s o  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  of  A m e r i c a )  f a c e d  an  i n c r e a s i n g  
hand icap  due t o  t h e i r  s low growth.  On a c c o u n t  o f  
the dynamic effects of fast growth it is possible that 
a particular country's products become qualitatively 
superior, and hence preferred to those of another 
country, in - all branches of industry. It can be 
argued that Japan's growth (and to some extent also 
Germany's growth) in the post World War I1 period 
was enhanced at the expense of che two trade-losing 
countries, the U.S. and the U.K. These latter countries 
suffered from increasing import penetration in their 
domestic markets of manufactures which was,not offset 
by higher exports, which meant in effect that their 
national output was reduced in consequence. (The 
labour released from manufacturing industry either 
remained unemployed or found employment in trades 
where its social marginal productivity is very low)." 
The polarization and scale phenomenon has been documented by 
Simmonds (1969) in the context of the Canadian-U.S. situation 
of the respective chemical industries: Figure 6 summarizes 
his data for ethylene. If Canada wishes to maintain a chemical 
industry in such sectors, and to build up the related high 
value-added, high wage and high skill employment, then some 
tariff protection will continue to be necessary until Canada's 
total production reaches a scale where the most efficient size 
of plants can be employed. 
These questions of scale are an important example of the 
divergence between the theoretical model of Ricardo and the 
Economist, and the political and technical realities of the 
world. There are however more specifically pressing contemporary 
strategic problems in European macro-economic management, to 
which we turn below. The materials already introduced reappear 
as part of broader issues. 
3.3 A Cluster of Contemporary Strategic Problems 
We opened this paper by a discussion of the role of O.R. 
in strategy. Similar issues were addressed by John Stringer 
(1976) in an important paper on the role of O.R. in public 
policy, itself echoing earlier expressions of concern (1962) by 
the Tavistock Institute and and O.R. Society, about O.R.'s 
slowness in penetrating the broad social and economic sphere. 
One of Stringer's contentions was that historically, O.R. had 
been 
"...a significant social invention ... The ability to 
offer new options was as significant as the ability 
to provide a rationale for choice between options that 
were already known. Unfortunately, a) quantitative 
analysis and b) being close to a powerful decision- 
maker, are the characteristics of those early days 
which have continued to be valued in O.R. circles. 
In that the analogy between 'operational commander' 
and 'public policy-maker' is a false one, it seems to 
me that these are not the values which should have 
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been carried across as dominant. A more fruitful 
analogy would have emphasized c) the creative syn- 
thesis aspects and d) service to the true analogue 
of 'commanderf--i.e., not a single powerful indivi- 
dual, but a process involving many actors." 
We follow Stringer in selecting 
"A cluster of issues ... salient problem areas which, 
if looked at together, might generate options that 
would be unlikely to arise from regarding them as 
separate problems." 
Within the class of problems which our historical experience 
has encouraged us to view as soluble, or at least capable of 
mitigation, by action in the public domain, two are of central 
relevance to Western Europe in the coming decades: 
1. The maintenance of employment 
2: The achievement of geographically balanced development. 
We shall link the discussion of these specific problems with the 
other issues already introduced--the applicability of the liberal 
free trade model, questions of scale, the development of national 
strategy in a tightly connected environment--and with the values 
underlying the politics of European integration. 
The problems exist on several levels, both broader and 
narrower than the European environment, being familiar in both 
national and global terms. However, if we start in the middle, 
we may shed light on the adjacent levels, and the European one 
is the obvious starting point in our current conference. We 
select the two issues out of the wider field of economic manage- 
ment in general because these two are seen as particularly 
linked with questions of European integration, unlike other 
(economically related) issues such as the control of inflation, 
or broader issues such as the validity of economic growth as a 
social objective. 
3.4 The Em~lovment Problem 
Within the framework and timespan chosen for this paper, 
population is taken as exogenously determined, as are the 
various age-sex-specific levels of desired participation in 
employment in each country. Our basic economic model is as 
follows: 
Gross output r Output per head x Number of Workers 
Number of Workers : Population desiring to work 
- involuntarily unemployed. 
So far, these are identities, which will hold good in every 
time period and country. In considering the evolution of 
economic activity over the next few decades, we have fairly 
accurate population forecasts. ~f productivity growth is taken 
as exogenous, then one is left with a direct connection between 
the rate of growth of output and the level of unemployment. 
Productivity growth is of course variable, but for the OECD 
countries the rate of growth of output per man-hour in manufac- 
turing industries has ranged from just under 3 to 5% p-a. over 
recent decades (see examples in Figure 7). The McCracken 
report (1977), which studied carefully the problem of the return 
to full employment, concluded that recent trends in labour 
productivity did not suggest any substantial deceleration. With 
population growth of around 1/2% p.a. typical of developed 
industrial societies at present, this indicates 3 1/2% p.a. as 
the minimum rate of growth to maintain constant unemployment; 
to reduce it from the levels it has already reached, which are 
historically very high by post-war standards, will require 
significantly higher. rates for the next few years. 
It is well-known that institutional factors in existing 
economic structures, reinforced by "employment protection" 
legislation, cause this high unemployment to be concentrated 
amongst young people, married women and "early retirers", i.e., 
the seytors least organized industrially. For the same reason, 
mobility in the labour force is inhibited. While reduced 
mobility and low growth may be conducive to some aspects of 
social stability--and the U.K.'s declining suicide rate contrasts 
with the rises in the faster-growing eocnomies of Europe 
(Sainsbury and Jenkins, 1979)--the concentration of unemployment 
among the young will lead to long-term alienation and social 
problems. 
There was therefore general agreement, when the OECD met 
at Ministerial level in June 1978, 
"...that given the disappointing economic record of 
recent years and the costs and dangers inherent in 
the continuation of present trends, more sustained 
economic growth was needed. It was recognized that, 
to create the conditions for this, internationally 
concerted action had to include many elements: 
energy policies, open international trading policies, 
and domestic policies designed to facilitate rather 
than resist adaptation to structural change, as well 
as appropriate domestic demand management and stabili- 
zation policies." (OECD, 1978) 
The OECD report recognizes the obvious--that in the current 
and prospective situation, the expansion of output is not 
supply-constrained--and therefore advocates the standard 
- -  - 
Keynesian prescription of "moderate national injections of 
purchasing power". However, having oftered the traditional 
remedy, the report even-handedly continues by explaining why 
what is suggested cannot in fact be implemented: 
"...for a single stimulating country, much of the 
stimulus typically leaks out into imports ... A 
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Figure 7. Index of Output per Man-Hour in Manufacturing, 
1975 = 100 
country which acts alone to raise demand and output 
therefore needs a relatively large domestic stimulus 
to achieve a given demand and employment effect-- 
and this is accompanied by a fairly substantial 
deterioration in its current external balance. This 
phenomenon has long been experieneed in the smaller 
OECD economies with proportionately large foreign 
trade sectors. But with the rising share of inter- 
national trade, upon which much of the general growth 
in prosperity over the last twenty years or more has 
been based, it appears that there may now be no 
economy which can indulge in a wholly 'go-it-alone' 
policy, ... it is clear that...it would be inappropriate 
for ail countries today to play an equiproportionate 
part in a general expansion .... Where an overriding 
constraint is the current balance position, countries 
should avoid taking unilateral stimulatory action." 
Thus the picture of the convicts' dilemma returns, in the 
modified version of Figure 8. As McCracken (1977) puts it, 
"if ever there was an example that...economics is not a zero- 
sum game, this is it." It is difficult to overcome the trust 
and co-ordination problems between two parties in this game; 
how much more so when it depends upon near-unanimity amongst 
half a dozen or more significant national economies, each of 
whose major decision-makers is simultaneously seeking to adapt 
to the needs of his internal environment of elections, wage 
claims and parliamentary business! 
Figure 8. "Convicts' Dilemma" Model of International Demand 
Expansion/~estriction Issue. 
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3.5 Balanced ~ e v e l o ~ r n e n t / P o l a r i z a t i o n  
The advantages of concentrating one's forces for maximum 
effectiveness have been known from -the earliest military 
strategists to the latest theorists of conventional warfare-- 
Lanchester's laws give the concepts mathematical precision. 
Industrial economies of scale have become similarly familiar 
over the past two centuries. These have been described by many 
authors, in industrial economics, plant engineering and other 
disciplines relevant to industrial management (see particularly 
Scherer (1970)r Scherer et al. (1975)r Gold (1975, 1978) and 
Cantley and Glagolev (1978, 1979)). 
Industrial economies of scale may be identified at several 
levels: 
1. The unit of equipment 
2. The total plant or factory 
3. The (multi-plant) organization. 
The scale economies achievable on these three levels are some- 
times referred to as internal, being largely within the control 
of the organization. Of no less significance are the external 
economies of scale, which concern the relationship between the 
organization and its environment. Thus its financial power 
(for bargaining with suppliers, customers, or long-term finance) 
increases with scale. But an important factor, perhaps the 
most important enabling factor, is at the level of the relevant 
environment, which althoush somewhat different in nature, should 
be added as. the fourth it& on the above list. The relevant 
environment is often seen in market terms, and as Simmonds (1969) 
has pointed out, the scale of nationa,l market is an important 
constraint on some capital intensive industries characterized by 
economies of scale. But there are more intangible advantages, 
dynamic as well as static, in the existence of large-scale 
industrial organization in a given geographical area. The 
climate of expectation is altered; the availability of a 
suitably educated workforce; the social infrastructure; all 
contribute to a positive feedback system which polarizes 
industrial development round a limited number of centres. 
Historically, natural factors such as mineral resources or 
deep water harbours may have given rise to industrial develop- 
ment. But eventually the accumulation of industry and society, 
with the resulting market potential and the industrial and 
social infrastructure, becomes itself a continuing attraction. 
Given the historic dispersion of population, transport costs to 
distribute goods determine the point where further economies 
of scale are outweighed by increasing transport cost. However, 
for a growing range of goods, the increasing value added per 
unit of weight diminishes the significance of transport in the 
final cost. Consequently the effective radius of the centralized 
production is increased, to the detriment of smaller scale 
producers who were previously defended by their isolation. where 
the field of attraction is gravitational, astronomers have described 
the results of such implosion processes as "black holes", from 
which escape is impossible. 
The economic analyst can readily demonstrate the gain in 
aggregate social welfare on conventional criteria. Less easily 
demonstrated are the diseconomies produced in congestion and in 
diminished quality of life in the urban areas, in the slums, 
the suburbs and the satellite towns. Because the centre exists, 
it is "not economic" to provide in these satellites facilities 
which would be taken for granted in isolated towns of similar 
population. 
The loss of vitality in the periphery, in the remoter 
provincial areas, the metropolitan drift of the economically 
active age-groups, and the gradually rising average age of those 
who remain--these can be documented all round the outer half of 
Europe, from Yugoslavia through Greece, Southern Italy, Spain 
and Portugal, large areas of France, Ireland, Northern England 
and Scotland. In "Tess of the dlUrbervilles", the novelist 
Thomas Hardy, writing of rural Wessex in the 1880s (when it 
was suffering the consequences of Britain's free trade, cheap 
food policies) refers to the economists who note "the natural 
tendency of rural people to move the towns" and comments that 
this tendency is "as natural as that of water to flow uphill 
when driven by machinery". 
Within national economies, there is in Western European 
democracies a virtually complete freedom of movement of people, 
goods and capital; and no national government has yet found 
effective means to control the process of regional polarization 
which has resulted. It is a problem related to the employment 
problem by the fact that in times of recession, the economic 
problems and the level of unemployment are typically greater in 
the depressed regions. The development of nationally determined 
uniform wages and working conditions has also removed one of the 
few instruments by which the peripheral regions might have 
effected a partial defence of their economies. 
If the national economies of Europe are to subordinate 
their autonomy and ability to control their destinies within a 
more uniform European set of rules, then clearly the welfare 
gains to be won from such a surrender must be both sufficient 
in total magnitude and sufficiently evenly distributed in their 
effects to command and to justify the necessary political 
support. There is neither historic empirical evidence nor 
reasoned argument at the current time to give one confidence in 
any such hypothesis, and there was little of either in President 
Jenkins' call for "a new economic impulse on an historic scale... 
by a faster move towards economic and monetary union" (Jenkins, 
1978). 
A careful article on this theme in the specific context of 
European monetary union and the U.K. by the N.I.E.S.R. (1979) 
states: 
"The creation of a single common market and monetary 
union may well reproduce the 'regional problem' only 
now at the national level. Within the new community 
some members nay find their entire economy suffering 
various 'regional' disabilities, for example ab- 
normally high unemployment, but they no longer 
dispose of the exchange rate instrument to assist 
recovery." 
Some of the possibilities of maladaptive strategies have 
now been introduced in the specific context of specific problems. 
In looking for new and better strategies, we pick up the strands 
of our theoretical development again. 
3.6 Adaptation to Turbulent Field Conditions, Values, and 
Corresponding Political Structures 
In a paper which follows and develops that in which Emery 
and Trist (1965) introduced the environmental types referred to 
in 2.3 above, Emery (1967) discusses how individuals and organi- 
zations adapt to the different types of environment. In Type 3, 
the disturbed reactive environment, whose salient characteristic 
is the presence and reactions of other participants, Emery 
comments: 
"There seems little doubt that even the formulation 
of strategic objectives is influenced by this kind 
of environment. It is much less appropriate to define 
the objective in terms of location in some relatively 
static and persisting environment. It is much more 
necessary to define the objective in terms of dev- 
eloping the capacity of power needed to be able to 
move more or less at will." (our emphasis) 
There are close similarities between this analysis and the 
conclusions of Friedrich List, already quoted, on the response 
to the imperial system. Ansoff 's "instrumentalism" , concentra- 
tion on the capabilities contributing to strategic strength, 
offers a similar conclusion in the context of competitive 
corporate strategy. 
However, ' Emery goes on to describe the trends--often the 
results of attempts to meet Type 3 "disturbed reactive" condi- 
tions--which have produced Type 4 "turbulent fields". 
"What is significant of our present era is the 
emergence of a degree of socfal organizational 
complexity and a rate of coalescence of previously 
segregated populations that defy our current efforts 
at symbolic reductionism. 
If our analysis is correct, then the next thirty 
years (at least) will evolve around men's attempts 
to create social forms and ways of life that are 
adaptive to turbulent environments or which down- 
grade them to the less complex types of environments." 
Of the forms of response which Emery then discussesr not 
all are appropriate to the context of national planning. He 
mentions 
"...fragmentation...the possibility of parts pursuing 
their ends without respect to the total system .... 
As a response to over-complexity this is adaptive, 
provided and insofar as there emerge other system 
relations which, while less binding, enable the en- 
hanced self-control of the part to be guided by a 
knowledge of the state, capacities and goals of the 
total system. Such system relations are emerging 
in national planning etc." 
Although Emery does not make the point, the potential relevance 
of this to the European Communities seems clear. 
More actively, Emery suggests that the emergence of values 
of over-riding significance for all members of a field is a 
common human response to persisting areas of relevant uncertainty. 
No European could dispute the central role which value systems 
have played as the driving forces of our history--a glance 
through the chapter headings of Joll's magnificent sweep, "Europe 
since 187OW, shows over half the chapter headings to be about 
values. An impressive paper which demonstrates the linkage from 
the details of industrial competence to the collective experience 
of a nation, is Gold's description (1978) of computerization in 
the Japanese steel industry: shared national values and a sense 
of commitment, along with the readiness to take the long-term 
view, he identifies as crucial. We refer elsewhere to Barnett's 
analysis of British values, similarly central to an understanding 
of strategic behaviour and policy. Values remain no less 
important in the European context as we seek to regain control 
of our economic system. The questions of choice of values, and 
of the means by which they impinge upon individuals and organi- 
zational structures, is seen by Emery as soluble by a single 
strategy. This is 
"...based on the notion that it is in the design of 
their social organization that men can make the biggest 
impact upon those environmental forces that mould 
their values. ... further, the strategy assumes that 
if these changes are made in the leading part, the 
socio-technical organizations, the effects will be 
more likely to spread more quickly than if made 
elsewhere.. . 
... the choice is really between whether a population 
seeks to enhance its chances of survival by strength- 
ening and elaborating special social mechanisms of 
control or by increasing the adaptiveness of its 
individual members; the latter is a feasible strategy 
in a turbulent environment and one to which western 
societies seem culturally biassed." 
Notwithstanding Emery's opinion, it seems to us that the 
two macro-economic problems we have discussed, structural un- 
employment and geographical polarization, demand a response at 
the level of social mechanism. Individual adaptation sounds 
like emigration of the talented. There is in Western Europe a 
long-standing and clearly evidenced desire, a "value" in Emery's 
terms, for individuals to control their own political destiny. 
This sense of control may be illusory; at the individual level, 
it almost always appears so; but societal arrangements and 
institutions should seek to enhance rather than diminish the 
citizen's control of his environment. In democratic societies 
the subordination of the individual to the majority will of the 
community is a social contract fundamentally based on the consent 
of the individual. The contract can be greatly strengthened if 
there exists widespread consensus of opinion within the society. 
Such consensus can be rapidly eroded,' however, at both national 
and European level, by the persistence of the problems we have 
discussed. Those of us who favour the concept of a united, 
European Community must aim to achieve a structure whose 
capability to solve strategic problems will merit our subordi- 
nating ourselves to its necessary constraints. This might be 
termed a "strategic functionalist" view, in line with the 
established concept of functionalism described below. 
To the general question of how far the individual should 
be expected to accept the constraints of communal action, the 
answers established by historic usage are multi-tiered: we 
recognize the need for different levels of scale for different 
functions. In our local communities we accept social controls 
and a common system of street-lighting, refuse collection etc.; 
I cannot opt to have my house frontage left in darkness. To the 
nation-state many of the wider powers have been subordinated, 
so that the .bulk of taxation to raise public revenue and the 
control of its expenditure are channelled through central 
government. The government may in turn subordinate its freedom 
in supra-national alliances and treaties, such as NATO or the 
Treaty of Rome. "The national framework is clearly 'too big 
now for some purposes that need smaller units; too small for 
other functions that need a supranational scale'" (Buchan (1969), 
quoting Kitzinger (1968)). 
Buchan wrote ten years ago, in the context of an extended 
essay on Europe's futures, that 
"some coherent structure is required that will still 
enable Europe to keep in sight the goal of economic 
and political unity, while remaining sufficiently 
open-ended to match and adapt itself to the possible 
shifts in the balance of power, and the cross-currents 
of the economic and financial forces ... The use of a 
variety of approaches will be the key to success. Such 
a Europe might be found in a strengthened form of 
functional cooperation; modelled on the community 
method, but neither seeking to embrace the totality 
of political responsibilities in the field of foreign 
policy and defence, nor looking to a federal super- 
state as its ultimate objective ... Common institutions 
can only be developed concurrently with common interests; 
they cannot create them. 
... such a functional system would be flexible and open. 
It could absorb changes in membership and extend itself 
into new fields, without a publicized confrontation 
with high national policies and without offending the 
pride of national sovereignty." 
Buchan credits the Rumanian, Mitrany (1965) with the exposition 
of this "functionalism", and Mitrany's writings have been widely 
influential; Spinelli (1957) points out that Mitrany probably 
developed his original concepts (in 1943) by transference from 
the multi-national military commands of world War 11. Hodges 
(1972) and Taylor (1968) also draw extensively on Mitrany. The 
conditions of war call forth (or demand) an extreme consent to 
constraint for common interest. In arguing for some constraint 
on trade propensities, we would similarly justify it by reference 
to the pressure of urgent need. 
The functionalist model is supported by the work of Dahl 
and Tufte (1974), who set out to determine "the optimum size 
for a political system". They recognized that different problems 
called for units of different sizes, and that the fundamental 
goals of citizen effectiveness and system capacity were in 
conflict. They looked at the "theoretical solution ... a system 
having an indefinite number of units without permanently fixed 
boundaries, a system capable therefore of ready and infinite 
adaptability", but dismissed this as too expensive and unsettling. 
Their compromise conclusion is "not an-optimal unit but an 
optional number of units with comparatively fixed boundaries". 
A basically functionalist view is similarly the conclusion 
of Leopold Kohr (1976) a lively and controversial writer whom 
one never knows quite how seriously to take: 
"[what] is needed is not the introduction of social 
controls but the reduction of social size to pro- 
portions within which fluctuations can do no harm 
because the market area through which they can 
transmit themselves is simply not large enough to 
permit dangerous amplifications." 
Kohr argues strongly for an optimum size of society, 
around 200r000. This is extendable by modern technological, 
educational and organizational tools to a maximum of 12 to 15 
millions, beyond which the performance of its functions dete- 
riorates; but he does not rule out supra-national association 
for specific purposes. The unique charm and the doubtful 
reasoning are captured in his panegyrical analysis of the budget 
of Liechtenstein (population 17',000), which he receives each 
year from the principality: 
"From the absence of funds set asi.de for an Un- 
Liechtensteinian Activities Committee one sees that 
problems of subversion, anxiety, and hysteria, so 
common in larger powers, are non-existent; and that, 
as a result, the mood of the country is placid and 
serene. I' 
3.7 The Inadequacy of t h e  F r e e  Trade Yodel;  Regula ted  Trade 
From what h a s  been s a i d ,  it w i l l  be c l e a r  t h a t  w e  a r e  
s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  th.e c u r r e n t  r e s p o n s e s  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  govern-  
ments of Europe,  and t h e  s t r a t e g i c  models o r  c o n c e p t s  on which 
t h o s e  r e s p o n s e s  are based ,  are i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  c u r r e n t  condi -  
t i o n s .  The s t r a t e g i c  model of  f r e e  t r a d e  l i b e r a l i s m  i s  unfo r -  
t u n a t e l y  r a t h e r  e x p l i c i t l y  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  T r e a t y  of  Rome, a s  
h a s  been no ted .  I n  f a c t ,  t h e  s t r a t e g y  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  t r e a t y  i s  
f a i l i n g  t o  m e e t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s ,  a l s o  w r i t t e n  i n t o  t h e  t r e a t y .  
F o r t u n a t e l y  t h e  p ragmat i c  heads  o f  Europe have r e p e a t e d l y  
demonst ra ted  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on p r a c t i c a l  e s s e n t i a l s ,  
and when n e c e s s a r y ,  p l a c e  t h e i r  c o l l e c t i v e  t e l e s c o p e  t o  t h e i r  
r e s p e c t i v e  b l i n d  e y e s .  
The European Community h a s  i n  p r a c t i c e  been much less t h a n  
d e d i c a t e d  i n  i t s  p u r s u i t  of  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  economic l i b e r a -  
l i s m .  The t r e a t y  i t se l f  r ecogn ized  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  
and s o c i a l  f a c t s  of European a g r i c u l t u r e ,  a l t h o u g h  a  r a t i o n a l  
r e s o l u t i o n  o f  i t s  problems i s  s t i l l  deba ted .  The common e x t e r -  
n a l  t a r i f f  e x p l i c i t l y  p r o t e c t s  European i n d u s t r y ,  b u t  i t s  
r e d u c t i o n - - p a r i  - passu  w i t h  p a r a l l e l  r e d u c t i o n s  by Japan ,  U.S.A. 
and o t h e r  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s - - i s  under  n e g o t i a t i o n  a t  t h e  GATT 
confe rence .  The d'Avignon p l a n s  f o r  i n d u s t r i e s  p lagued  by 
e x c e s s  capac i ty - - in  p a r t i c u l a r  s tee l - -do  n o t  f o l l o w  t h e  f r e e  
marke t  l o g i c  of  "weakest  t o  t h e  w a l l " ;  b u t  s eek  t o  c u t  c a p a c i t y  
w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  h i s t o r i c  marke t  s h a r e s .  Such c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of  Commission-approved r e - s t r u c t u r i n g  p l a n s  s a y  much a b o u t  
p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s  i n  Europe, and a b o u t  t h e  f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  Commission i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of t h e  t r e a t y .  
But t h e y  do  n o t  m e e t  t h e  problem d e s c r i b e d  i n  3.4 above--which 
would stress n o t  s o  much "excess  c a p a c i t y "  (which cou ld  occas ion -  
a l l y  o c c u r  i n  s p e c i f i c  i n d u s t r i e s )  as t h e  g e n e r a l  c u r r e n t  
" d e f i c i e n c y  i n  demand". A s  Edmond Maire ,  t h e  French t r a d e  
union  l e a d e r ,  e x p r e s s e d  it ( 1 9 7 9 ) :  
" B a r r e  and Schmidt c l a i m  t h e r e  h a s  t o  be  more i n v e s t -  
ment t o  c r e a t e  jobs .  I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  i nves tmen t  i s  
l a r g e l y  i n  manpower s a v i n g .  I f  w e  a g r e e d  t o  a c c e p t  
t h e i r  b rand  o f  a u s t e r i t y ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  w i l l  
make more p r o f i t s  and w e  won' t  g e t  more jobs .  W e  
w i l l  have h i g h e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y - - b u t  s t i l l  no jobs .  
Jobs w i l l  come o n l y  from an  i n d u s t r i a l  and s o c i a l  
p o l i c y  conce ived  on  an  a l l -Europe  s c a l e  ... f i r m l y  
p r o t e c t i o n i s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  o u t s i d e  wor ld ."  
The r e a s o n s  why demand c a n n o t  be  s t i m u l a t e d  have a l r e a d y  
been  o u t l i n e d  i n  3.4.  The examples quo ted  i n d i c a t e  t h e  v a r i o u s  
messy compromises which a r e  made w i t h  t h e  h i s t o r i c  p r i n c i p l e s ;  
b u t  t h e y  a r e  n e i t h e r  s o l v i n g  t h e  contemporary problems f u l l y ,  
no r  i l l u m i n a t i n g  t h e  s e a r c h  f o r  new s t r a t e g i c  p r i n c i p l e s .  
A s t a t e m e n t  on t h e s e  l i n e s  h a s  j u s t  been p u b l i s h e d  by a  
group of 16 economis ts  from I t a l y ,  F rance  and B r i t a i n ,  whose 
c o n c l u s i o n s  are a s  f o l l o w s  (Formica e t  a l . ,  1979) :  
"Existing policies in the Community, including EMS, 
fail to solve the problem of unemployment because 
they.do not deal with the constraint imposed by 
world recession; they do not distribute growth 
between member countries in accordance with need; and 
they do not permit or support measures to develop 
production in regions of under-employment and low 
productivity. 
There is a wide range of alternative policies. The 
Community must find ways of examining them and 
putting at least some into effect. Otherwise many 
of its member countries and regions may never achieve 
the employment and prosperity which was the 
Community's original aim. 
The time has come for members of the Community to 
recognize that new forms of organization are needed 
to deal with the world economic crises and with the 
problem of national and regional inequality." 
The strategy built into the treaty is failing to meet the 
objectives, and there is no explicit strategic monitoring and 
control system whereby the failure of the old model can be 
officially recognized. "Official" opinion fulminates against 
protectionism as heresy, as in the GATT Secretariat's annual 
report: 
"Without a basic change in the present trend of inter- 
national trade policy--that is, without a clear return 
to more liberal trade practices, accompanied by the 
necessary adjustment measures--the stage would appear 
to be set for a further cumulation of economic diffi- 
culties ... increasing protectionism generates economic 
uncertainty ..." (GATT, 1978) 
Nowzard (1978) of the IMF gives the same message, albeit 
with an opposite opinion on protectionism's short-term effects: 
"...such restraints may perhaps introduce an element 
of certainty in trade relations over the short term. 
Even SO, the organization of markets does not appear 
to be conducive to the dynamic evolution of trade 
according to the principles of comparative advantage, 
efficiency and nondiscrimination ..." 
Such authors think they are fighting to keep countries in 
the top left-hand cell of Figure 4; but the open market environ- 
ment is in fact holding many countries in the bottom right-hand 
box of Figure 8. 
The IMF's economic orthodoxy is legend, and has been 
strongly criticized, e.g., by Cheryl Peyer (1974), for its 
uncritical use of comparative advantage, leading for example to 
the encouragement in the third world of monoculture cash crops, 
which are vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and per- 
petuate dependency. Reynolds (1978) like Kaldor has suggested 
that the third-world countries would be better advised to break 
this pattern and trade liberally with one another, while pro- 
tecting their infant industries against the developed world. 
But the pragmatists in governments are largely unsupported by 
the economic orthodoxy in academic and international institutions. 
Thus suggestions for new models have to be unofficially initiated 
and developed, and ritually condemned as heresy, before they are 
seriously considered as a basis for revising official policy. 
Godley (1978) and his colleagues (Godley and Cripps, 1978) 
have followed through the logic of the situation so clearly 
identified by the OECD (as quoted in 3.4 above), and although 
their work has been framed in a U.K. context, it is clearly of 
wider application. 
They propose that the U.K. should escape from the bottom 
right-hand box of the convicts' dilemma in Figure 8, by control- 
ling the total level of U.K. imports. The words "import control" 
immediately indicate the heresy, the apostasy from the ideals 
of liberalism and the violation of the treaty of Rome; and have 
attracted a correspondingly hostile reaction (The Economist, 
1978; Godley, 1978). This is understandable in terms of these 
frameworks, but not particularly logical, since the U.K. in 
common with many other countries already controls its imports, 
indirectly, by depressing the total level of donestic demand 
below the productive potential of the economy. In other words, 
by deflation and unemployment. 
Cripps (1978) has pointed out that releasing "balance- 
of-payments-constrained" countries from their constraint need 
not reduce world trade. It is only by enabling the constrained 
countries to regulate their trade propensities that they can 
expand domestic output to its full employment potential. At 
this higher level of output, their import needs will be not 
less than in the case of deflated restriction of output; and 
"indeed if the composition of its imports is shifted 
against 'surplus' countries and the latter do not 
retaliate, the total volume of world trade will rise, 
enabling the rest of the world to expand production; 
'surplus' countries will regain elsewhere trade which 
they have lost in the country which discriminates 
against them and therefore will have no valid reason 
for retaliations." 
To translate the new strategic model which Godley proposes 
into the European environment would give new meaning to the OECD 
concept of "concerted reflation". It would incorporate some 
sort of agreement on "organized trade" on the lines being hinted 
at by the French prime minister, M. Barre, whom Kaldor (1978) 
quotes as follows: 
"...there should be new 'rules of the game' (which 
should be collectively defined and applied) which 
assure conditions of growth, security and regularity 
of trade without which 'free trade is nothing more 
than a pretext for the strongest and least scrupulous 
as well as being a trap for the weakest'". 
Amongst academic economists, the "new Cambridge" school 
(Godley et al) have been slow to win converts (though Beckerman, 
1979, has given his clear-cut assent). The tone of side-line 
commentators, the financial journalists, has moved from condem- 
natory to equivocal. But the politicians are naturally more 
responsive than the academics to the growing need for some 
changes to be made in the unsatisfactory real world. As Jenkins 
(1978) says in his presidential address to the European Commission, 
"...we must not take refuge behind a theoretical. 
concept of the market economy in order to sidestep 
the responsibilities which the crisis of industry 
imposes on the governments and on the Community." 
Perceiving such defections from the paths of righteousness, 
Cohen (1978) stridently warns against the emergence of "a new 
strain of protectionism", 
"The delicate tension between the relatively long- 
range logic of expanding world trade based on an 
international specialization of labour and the 
immediacy of official concern for the health of the 
domestic economy has become tilted in favour of the 
latter. " 
And yet in the same paper, Cohen observes that certain dynamic, 
non-Western societies 
"appear to operate beyond the pale of traditional 
Western trade theory. ... Japan's trade surplus in 
manufactured goods of some $63 billion in 1977 cannot 
be fully explained by the principle of comparative 
advantage." 
Clearly, as operational researchers know, if human behaviour 
isn't fitting the theoretical model, their behaviour must be 
wrong; consequently Cohen berates the Japanese for their 
"generally impenetrable distribution system ... their notorious 
practice of subtle administrative guidance to pressure 
importers ..." Cohen, of course, from an American background, 
has some justification for criticizing the industry-specific 
protection which union pressure has maintained in sectors such 
as the U.S. textile industry. As Godley (1978) points out, 
a general control of the total import level nay be combined 
with a complete'absence of long-term industry-specific protec- 
tion, allowing market disciplines to stimulate internal effi- 
ciency; indeed Godley is particularly critical of "creeping 
protectionism". 
The general lines of the solution proposed, in its resto- 
ration of control of aggregate inward trade flows to individual 
nation states, is precisely in line with the suggestion by 
Emery (see 3.6 above) of down-grading the turbulent field 
c:rlv i ronmcnL t o  a lcss complex one ,  by " f r a g m e n t a t i o n "  a s  o u t l i n e d  
i n  t h e  p reced ing  s e c t i o n .  I t  r e t u r n s  a  v i t a l  d e g r e e  of  c o n t r o l  
t o  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  c a p a c i t y  of  t h e  s t a t e  
t o  meet e f f e c t i v e l y  t h e  needs  o f  i t s  c o n s t i t u e n t  c i t i z e n s .  T h i s ,  
a f t e r  a l l ,  is what n a t i o n  s t a t e s  a r e  f o r ,  a s  no ted  by t h e  p o l i -  
t i c a l  t h e o r i s t s  quo ted  above. Moreover, it is p r e c i s e l y  w r i t t e n  
i n t o  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Rome ( "Af f i rming  a s  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  o b j e c t i v e  
o f  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t h e  c o n s t a n t  improvement o f  t h e  l i v i n g  and  
working c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  p e o p l e s " ) .  An i n p o r t a n t  b u t  funda-  
m e n t a l l y  t e c h n i c a l  recommendation--and t h i s  p a p e r  is a b o u t  t e c h -  
n i c a l  ques t ions- -should  n o t  b e  s e e n  as n e c e s s a r i l y  i n i m i c a l  t o  
t h o s e  wide r  i n t e r e s t s - - i n c l u d i n g  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  mu tua l  b a l a n c e d  
trade--which European i n t e g r a t i o n  can  promote.  A s  P r e s i d e n t  Roy 
J e n k i n s  (1979) p u t  it i n  h i s  o b i t u a r y  f o r  t h e  g r e a t  J e a n  Monnet, 
" f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  method, and cons t ancy  of  g o a l " .  
4 .  CONCLUSION 
I n  c o n c l u s i o n r  l e t  u s  b r i e f l y  r e - c a p i t u l a t e .  W e  have 
sugges t ed  t h a t  t h e  conduc t  of  long-term s t r a t e g y  i n  g e n e r a l ,  
and s p e c i f i c a l l y  t h e  conduc t  o f  macro-economic p o l i c y  a t  n a t i o n a l  
and s u p r a - n a t i o n a l  l e v e l ,  are n o t  s u b j e c t s  which need o r  shou ld  
b e  r e s e r v e d  f o r  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  s p e c i a l i z e d  econo- 
m i s t s .  T h a t  s t r a t e g i c  i s s u e s  such  a s  t h e s e  can  u s e f u l l y  b e  
s u b j e c t s  o f  s t u d y  by o p e r a t i o n a l  r e s e a r c h e r s  and o t h e r s ;  and 
t h a t  t h e r e  a p p e a r  t o  b e  s t r o n g  grounds f o r  q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  
s t r a t e g i c  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  one  o f  t h e  b a s i c  models  o f  t h e  
c o n v e n t i o n a l  wisdom. 
The i s s u e s  w e  have d i s c u s s e d  are of  c e n t r a l  impor tance  t o  
t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  economic and i n d u s t r i a l  s t r a t e g y ,  a t  b o t h  
n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  and i n  t h e  European Commission. W e  have d i s -  
ag reed  w i t h  some o f  t h e  a r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  T r e a t y  of Rome, b u t  
o n l y  because  w e  have  a rgued  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e  means 
by which t o  p u r s u e  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  T r e a t y :  
o b j e c t i v e s  t o  which w e  g l a d l y  s u b s c r i b e .  But p r o g r e s s  t owards  
t h e  s o c i a l  and  p o l i t i c a l  g o a l s  o f  a s t r o n g  and u n i t e d  Europe 
w i l l  n o t  b e  advanced by methods which a r e  d e s t r u c t i v e  o f  t h e  
i n d u s t r i a l  c a p a b i l i t y  and s o c i a l  f a b r i c  i n  l a r g e  a r e a s  of  o u r  
c o n t i n e n t .  The d r i v e  towards  t h e s e  o b j e c t i v e s  w i l l  b e  more 
e f f e c t i v e l y  s u s t a i n e d  i f  ba sed  on s h a r e d  d e m o c r a t i c  and s o c i a l  
v a l u e s ,  t h a n  i f  r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  t h e  t e c h n o c r a t i c  p r o g r e s s  towards  
implementing t h e  n a i v e  a l g e b r a i c  models o f  t h e  1840s.  
A s  e f f o r t s  a t  w o u l d - b e - s c i e n t i f i c  a n a l y s i s  and p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  
w e  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  t h a t  " S t r a t e g i c  O.R." s t u d i e s  l a c k  t h e  g r e a t e r  
r i g o u r  o f  " T a c t i c a l  O.R.". How s t r a t e g i c  s t u d i e s  should  b e  
conducted  is n o t  y e t  clear;  b u t  some t o o l s  have been o f f e r e d .  
The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l ong -pe r iod  r e l e v a n t  d a t a ,  and t h e  v a l i d a -  
t i o n  of  a c l e a r - c u t  model based  on t h i s  d a t a ,  cannot  b e  expec ted  
t o  approach  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  of s t a t i s t i c a l  r i g o u r  a c h i e v a b l e  i n  
more l o c a l i z e d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  T h e r e f o r e  one  must b e  more t h a n  
u s u a l l y  c o n s c i o u s  of  t h e  " p r o v i s i o n a l "  s t a t u s  of  o n e ' s  model. 
However, because  of  t h e  t ime-spans invo lved  i n  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  o f  
e r r o r ,  t h e  " p r o v i s i o n a l "  p e r i o d  i s  l ong ,  and fundamenta l  l e a r n i n g  
is bound to be slow. This does not in principle change the 
methodology; but since human memories are short, there may be 
advantages in spelling out our strategic models, and making 
explicit forecasts based on them, as grist for the nil1 of 
strategic monitoring and control. In such ways we can con- 
tribute to the ongoing processes of public and institutional 
learning, adaptation and increased strategic effectiveness. 
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